Hidden Truth: The Perils and Protection of Off-Label Drug and Medical Device Promotion by Conko, Gregory
Health Matrix: The Journal of Law-
Medicine
Volume 21 | Issue 1
2011
Hidden Truth: The Perils and Protection of Off-
Label Drug and Medical Device Promotion
Gregory Conko
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Health Matrix: The Journal of Law-Medicine by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Gregory Conko, Hidden Truth: The Perils and Protection of Off-Label Drug and Medical Device Promotion, 21 Health Matrix 149 (2011)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/healthmatrix/vol21/iss1/8
HIDDEN TRUTH: THE PERILS AND
PROTECTION OF OFF-LABEL DRUG
AND MEDICAL DEVICE PROMOTION
Gregory Conkot
INTRODUCTION
What can you do if you learn you have a life-threatening illness
but there is no Food and Drug Administration-approved medicine to
treat it? Sometimes, there is nothing to do but hope. Very often,
though, your doctor will be able to prescribe a drug or medical device
that has been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
for a different condition. This practice, called "off-label" prescribing,
is perfectly legal, commonly practiced within the medical community,
viewed as an essential component of good medical care, and offers
greater choice in treatment options for millions of American patients.
It is not without controversy, however.
Because the safety and efficacy of off-label uses have not been
certified by FDA, some in government and the public health commu-
nity have long criticized the practice.' And FDA has long forbidden
drug and device makers from disseminating most information about
off-label uses, often making it difficult for doctors and their patients to
learn about important therapeutic options.2
No federal statute explicitly forbids manufacturers from promot-
ing or otherwise disseminating information about off-label uses of
their drugs and devices. FDA has, however, extended its authority
over product labeling to encompass manufacturers' speech in other
contexts-including print and broadcast advertisements, brochures
t Senior Fellow, Competitive Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C.; J.D.,
George Mason University School of Law.
1 See, e.g., Stephen Barlas, New FDA Guidance on Off-Label Promotion
Falls Short for Everyone: Obama Administration Is Likely to Revisit It, 34 PHARMACY
& THERAPEUTICS 122, 122 (2009); Henry A. Waxman, A History of Adverse Drug
Experiences: Congress Had Ample Evidence to Support Restrictions on the Promo-
tion ofPrescription Drugs, 58 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 299, 300 (2003).
2 See Sam Kazman, A National Survey of Orthopedic Surgeons Regarding
the Food and Drug Administration and the Availability of New Drugs, COMPETITIVE




and pamphlets, websites, conferences and seminars, and face-to-face
communication.3 The agency bars nearly all speech promoting an off-
label use regardless of its veracity, and vigorously enforces this re-
striction even when the information is not being broadcast to lay au-
diences but is provided directly to physicians with sophisticated
medical training.
Manufacturers may speak freely about off-label uses when physi-
cians seek that information on their own accord.4 And, in certain cir-
cumstances, the agency even permits drug and device makers to dis-
tribute unsolicited, peer-reviewed medical journal articles and
textbook reprints describing off-label uses to physicians.' This is
viewed not as "promotion," but as "education." If the distribution of
such materials falls outside FDA's narrow limits, however, the agency
is likely to view that speech as unlawful promotion, regardless of
whether the information provided is false or misleading.
Ironically, physicians and laymen not paid by a drug or device's
manufacturer are free to tout the benefits of off-label uses in any way
and to any listener. Doctors are free, and indeed are often encouraged
by the federal government, to prescribe drugs and devices for off-label
uses.6 But as legal scholars have noted, if two physicians were to pro-
vide identical truthful and non-misleading information about off-label
uses to an identical audience, one of them can be hailed as a medical
pioneer and the other convicted of a federal crime solely on the basis
of the second doctor's financial ties to a drug or medical device com-
pany.7 Naturally, this inconsistency has raised questions about the
constitutionality of FDA's treatment of off-label promotion.
Commercial speech is afforded less constitutional protection than
pure political or scientific speech. However, the First Amendment
forbids the government from regulating truthful and non-misleading
commercial speech about lawful conduct in a manner that is more
See infra Section III and accompanying notes.
4 21 C.F.R. § 99.1 (2010).
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, GOOD REPRINT
PRACTICES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND MEDICAL OR
SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW USES OF APPROVED
DRUGS AND APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES (2009) [hereinafter GOOD
REPRINT GUIDANCE], available at
http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/98fr/FDA-2008-D-0053-gdl.pdf.
6 See John E. Calfee, Public Policy Issues in Direct-to-Consumer Advertis-
ing of Prescription Drugs, 21 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 174, 183 (2002) (noting
that practice guidelines disseminated by agencies within the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services recommend off-label uses for certain indications).
7 Ralph F. Hall & Elizabeth S. Sobotka, Inconsistent Government Policies:
Why FDA Off-Label Regulation Cannot Survive First Amendment Review Under
Greater New Orleans, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 1, 9-10 (2007).
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restrictive than necessary to achieve a substantial governmental inter-
est. 8 FDA insists that its bar on off-label promotion is necessary to
achieve three interrelated governmental interests: protecting public
health through its certification of drug and medical device safety, pre-
serving the integrity of the drug and device approval process, and en-
suring that physicians and patients do not receive inaccurate or biased
information that may influence prescribing decisions.9
If manufacturers may promote medical products for off-label uses,
the argument goes, there is no incentive for them to seek approval for
these uses. Thus, the agency has no occasion to evaluate the scientific
support for such claims, and physicians and their patients may be per-
suaded to use products that are unsafe or ineffective. FDA and other
supporters of the ban recount sordid stories of snake oil salesmen
peddling approved products for off-label uses with unproven, exagge-
rated, or fraudulent health claims, and they argue that eliminating the
ban would open the floodgates for such objectionable conduct.10
The First Amendment does not protect false, fraudulent, or even
unintentionally misleading speech, and federal courts have recognized
FDA's substantial interest in policing off-label speech in order to pro-
tect the public from unsafe or ineffective uses of drugs and devices. 1
However, there are many less-burdensome alternatives that could
promote the government's interests equally well, if not better. The
near-total ban on off-label promotion is therefore overly-broad and far
more restrictive than necessary to achieve the government's interests.
Therefore, it fails the test for proscriptions of commercial speech es-
tablished by the Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission.12
Section I of this Article examines the convention of off-label pre-
scribing, its role in the practice of medicine, and its broad support
within the medical community. It also sets out some of the pros and
cons of the practice. Section II discusses the evolution of the Food,
8 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
564 (1980); see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976) ("[S]peech does not lose its First Amendment protec-
tion because money is spent to project it, as a paid advertisement. . . .").
9 Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331, 337 (D.C. Cir. 2000);
Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman (WLF 1), 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 69 (D.D.C. 1998).
1o See, e.g., Mem. of Public Citizen as Amicus Curiae in Support of Def's
Mot. for Summ. J. and in Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. for a Prelim. Inj., Allergan, Inc. v. Unit-
ed States, No. 09-1879 (D.D.C. dismissed 2010) [hereinafter Public Citizen Br.];
Waxman, supra note 1, at 300-01.
1 See, e.g., United States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912, 921 (N.D. Ill.
2003); WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 69.
12 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566.
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Drug and Cosmetics Act and FDA's role in the drug and device ap-
proval process.
Section III turns specifically to the regulation of medical product
labeling and advertising, and discusses FDA's regulation of off-label
speech. In particular, that section examines Congress's and the agen-
cy's effort to carve out limited exemptions for certain types of off-
label speech, and it introduces a discussion of the treatment by federal
courts of off-label speech restrictions. Section IV examines three re-
cent court challenges to the off-label promotion ban, one of which was
still on-going at the time of publication.
Section V discusses the scope of permissible commercial speech
regulation and analyzes the constitutionality of off-label speech re-
strictions in light of applicable case law. It finds that FDA's current
ban on off-label promotion is unconstitutional, but suggests less bur-
densome alternative restrictions that likely would pass constitutional
muster while still advancing the government's asserted interests.
I. WHAT IS OFF-LABEL PRESCRIBING?
All new drugs and biological products13 and most new medical
devices must be certified by FDA as both safe and effective for a spe-
cified use before they can be sold in the United States.14 As part of the
FDA-administered approval process, manufacturers must submit a
proposed label that includes, among other things, the medical condi-
tion the drug or device is intended to treat, the appropriate dose and
route of administration, relevant patient characteristics (such as age,
health status, race, etc.), and any warnings or precautions regarding
identified risks associated with the products, along with laboratory test
data and clinical trial results demonstrating the products to be safe and
effective when used as indicated.15
13 Biological products, or "biologics," are medical products derived from
living organisms, including such things as vaccines, serums, antitoxins, whole blood
and blood derivatives, etc., regulated under section 351 of the Public Health Services
Act (PHSA) (42 U.S.C. § 262 (2006)) as well as under the drug provisions of the
Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act (21 U.S.C. §§ 355-60 (2006)). The PHSA establishes
a special approval scheme for biologics, but in all ways relevant to this article, the
regulation of drugs and biologics is identical. See 21 U.S.C. § 352 (2006); GEOFFREY
M. LEVIYr, THE DRUGs/BIOLOGIcs APPROVAL PROCESS 113, 155 (Kenneth R. Pina &
Wayne L. Pines eds., 3d ed. 2008).
14 See 21 U.S.C. § 355 for drugs; 42 U.S.C. § 262 for biologics; and 21
U.S.C. § 360e for devices.
15 For drugs, see 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) and 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(c)(2) (2010);
for biologics, see 42 U.S.C. § 262 and 21 C.F.R. § 601.2(a); for devices, see 21
U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1)(F) and 21 C.F.R. § 801.1, 801.4, 801.5.
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FDA evaluates applications and determines whether the products
are safe and effective for their intended uses under the conditions set
forth in the proposed labeling, and the agency makes an approval de-
cision with respect to the indicated uses only.16 Thus, when it ap-
proves a drug or device, FDA approves both the product itself and its
accompanying label, and the label generally may not be changed
without a subsequent agency approval.' 7 This approved use is known
as the product's "label indication" or "on-label" use.
FDA's regulatory authority does not extend to the practice of
medicine, however. So, once a drug or device is placed on the market,
physicians may legally prescribe it for any safe and effective off-label
use, governed only by professional medical standards and the licens-
ing authority in each state.' 8 The U.S. Supreme Court' 9 and FDA 20
have expressly recognized that health care professionals may legally
prescribe approved drugs for off-label uses. Such uses may include
prescribing the product for the approved medical condition but in a
different dose, with a different frequency, to a patient outside the ap-
proved population, or via a different route of administration (i.e., via
subcutaneous injection rather than in oral form).
Off-label uses may also include prescribing the product for a med-
ical condition that is different from the approved, on-label use. For
example, the oncology drug Platinol (cisplatin) has been approved for
the treatment of bladder, testicular, and ovarian cancer, and it works
by "halt[ing] the uncontrolled growth of cancer cells by interrupting
the copying of DNA in growing cells." 2 1 But, because this mechanism
of action makes it useful in combating many different kinds of can-
cerous tumors, Platinol is also frequently prescribed off-label to treat
thyroid and lung cancers.22
21 U.S.C. §§ 352, 355(b), 355(d); 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.5, 314.
17 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). But see 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c) ("changes being ef-
fected" regulation permitting manufacturers to strengthen safety language without
prior FDA approval).
18 See David A. Kessler, The Regulation of Investigational Drugs, 320 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 281, 285 (1989).
19 Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001).
20 Citizen Petition Regarding the Food and Drug Administration's Policy on
Promotion of Unapproved Uses of Approved Drugs and Devices, 59 Fed. Reg.
59,820, 59,821 (Nov. 18, 1994).
21 Understanding the Approval Process for New Cancer Treatments; Q&A:
Off-Label Drugs, NAT'L CANCER INST.,
www.cancer.gov/clinicaltrials/leaming/approval-process-for-cancer-drugs/page5 (last




Similarly, the drug Rituxan (rituximab) was approved in 1997 to
treat certain types of non-Hodgkins lymphoma. 2 3 It proved to be so
beneficial, the drug was soon being used off-label to treat various oth-
er cancers and several conditions affecting the immune system, in-
cluding lupus, multiple sclerosis, and arthritis. 2 4 These off-label uses,
developed by practicing physicians, led the manufacturer to conduct
clinical trials, eventually resulting in additional approvals for chronic
lymphocytic leukemia and rheumatoid arthritis.25
The practice of off-label prescribing is widespread, and is com-
mon in every field of medicine. A survey of physicians conducted in
2001 indicated that 21% of 160 commonly prescribed drugs were used
for off-label uses,2 6 though others estimate that as many as 60% of all
prescriptions are written for off-label uses. 2 7
Off-label uses are frequently considered to be state of the art
treatment "[b]ecause the pace of medical discovery runs ahead of the
FDA's regulatory machinery."2 8 Consequently, most private health
insurance plans with prescription drug benefits cover various off-label
uses, as do Medicare and Medicaid. 29 And practice guidelines disse-
minated by various agencies within the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services (FDA's parent body), such as the National
Cancer Institute and the National Cholesterol Education Program,
specifically recommend certain off-label uses.30 The American Medi-
cal Association (AMA) has noted that "clinically appropriate medical
practice at times requires the use of pharmaceuticals for 'off-label'
indications." 31 Consequently, physicians may even be subject to mal-
practice liability if they do not use drugs and devices for off-label
23 Candice J. Bruce, Rituran@ Anniversary: 10 Years of Progress,
ONCOLOGY Bus. REV., Nov. 2007, at 18, available at
http://www.oncbiz.com/documents/OBRI 107_RA.pdf.
24 Id. at 19.
25 Id
26 David C. Radley et al., Off-label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physi-
cians, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1021 (2006).
27 James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed
Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71, 80 (1998).
28 Richardson v. Miller, 44 S.W.3d 1, 13 n. I1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).
29 See Joshua Cohen et al., Off-Label Use Reimbursement, 64 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 391 (2009).
30 Calfee, supra note 6, at 183.
3 American Medical Association, MEMORANDUM OF THE AMA HOUSE OF
DELEGATES, Resolution 820: Off-Label Use of Pharmaceuticals,
http://tinyurl.com/yfpwmyo (last visited Sep. 21, 2005).
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indications when doing so constitutes the medically recognized stan-
dard of care. 3 2
The AMA has repeatedly studied the practice and has voiced its
"strong support for the autonomous clinical decision-making authority
of a physician," and agrees that "a physician may lawfully use an
FDA approved drug product or medical device for an unlabeled indi-
cation."33 That is not surprising given the overwhelming amount of
support among practicing physicians for maintaining the legality of
off-label prescriptions. In a 2008 survey conducted by economists at
George Mason University, 94% of the physician respondents said they
would oppose any change in the law that would prevent doctors from
prescribing drugs for off-label indications.34 Just 2% said they would
35favor such a change, and 4% said they were not sure.
Although it is used in every field of medicine, off-label prescrib-
ing is particularly prevalent in psychiatry, oncology, and pediatrics.36
A 1991 study by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO, now
known as the Government Accountability Office) found that one-third
of the drugs prescribed for the treatment of cancer were off-label, and
that more than half of all cancer patients received at least one drug for
an off-label indication. 37 According to a 2007 study, off-label uses
also account for nearly 50% of cardiac medications and anticonvul-
sant drug prescriptions. 38
Similarly, patients with rare, or so-called "orphan" diseases, are
especially dependent on off-label uses for their treatment because the
number of patients with each orphan disease is often too low to justify
the tremendous expense of seeking FDA's approval for those indica-
tions.39 An estimated 21% of all drugs prescribed to treat orphan dis-
32 Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of FDA-
Approved Drugs: An Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L.
REV. 181, 190-91 (1999).
3 AM. MED. Ass'N, HEALTH AND ETHICS POLICIES OF THE AMA HOUSE OF
DELEGATES 103-05 (Policy H-120.988), http://www.ama-assn.org/ad-
com/polfind/Hlth-Ethics.pdf [hereinafter HEALTH AND ETHICS POLICIES].
34 Daniel B. Klein & Alexander Tabarrok, Do Off-Label Drug Practices
Argue Against FDA Efficacy Requirements? A Critical Analysis of Physicians' Argu-
mentation for Initial Efficacy Requirements, 67 AM. J. ECoN. & Soc. 743, 750 (2008).
35 id.
36 Muriel R. Gillick, Controlling Off-Label Medication Use, 150 ANN.
INTERNAL MED. 344, 344 (2009).
3 U.S. Gov'T GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/PEMD-91-14, OFF-
LABEL DRUGS: REIMBURSEMENT POLICIES CONSTRAIN PHYSICIANS IN THEIR CHOICE OF
CANCER THERAPIES 3 (1991).
38 Radley et al., supra note 26.
3 Bryan A. Liang & Tim Mackey, Reforming Off-Label Promotion to En-
hance Orphan Disease Treatment, 327 SCI. 273, 273 (2010).
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eases, and up to 83% for certain diseases, are off-label.40 With clinical
testing and the supplemental application process taking five to ten
years and costing hundreds of millions of dollars, 41 getting on-label
approval for an orphan disease could put the price of many treatment
options out of reach for these vulnerable patients.
Unfortunately, not all off-label uses prove to be effective or safe.
Occasionally, off-label uses that anecdotally appear to have substan-
tial efficacy later are shown to be ineffective. Others may be used for
years without physicians fully understanding their attendant risks.
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, for example, American doctors pre-
scribed an unapproved combination of estrogen and progestin to
millions of post-menopausal women in the expectation that this hor-
mone replacement therapy would help prevent bone loss and relieve
menopause symptoms. 4 2 A comprehensive study published in 2002,
however, revealed that the off-label combination could increase the
risk of breast cancer, heart attacks, strokes, and blood clots. 43 Similar-
ly, an estimated six million patients were prescribed the unapproved
combination of weight loss drugs fenfluramine and phentermine dur-
ing the 1980s and 1990s "on the basis of a single study involving just
121 patients."" But a study published in 1997 indicated that this
"fen-phen" combination might cause heart valve defects in as many as
one-third of patients.45
Still, for many conditions, off-label uses are considered to be es-
sential for the practice of medicine, and their safety and efficacy have
been demonstrated through substantial clinical testing. "In fact, a drug
given off-label may have been proven to be safer and more beneficial
than any drug labeled for that disease."46 According to the GAO's
Director of Health Services Quality and Public Health Issues, "this
occurred with some frequency in the cancer area where drugs that had
been approved for one form of cancer were subsequently shown to
40 Id
41 See, e.g., Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price ofInnovation: New Estimates
ofDrug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151 (2003).
42 See Gina Kolata & Melody Petersen, Hormone Replacement Study a Shock
to the Medical System, N.Y. TIMEs, July 10, 2002, at Al.
43 id
4 Gina Kolata, How Fen-Phen, A Diet 'Miracle,'Rose and Fell, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 23, 1997, at Fl.
45 id
46 Off-Label Drug Use and FDA Review of Supplemental Drug Applications:
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. On Human Resources and Intergovernmental Rela-
tions of the H. Comm. on Government Reform and Oversight, 104th Cong. 12 (1996)
(statement of Sarah F. Jaggar).
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have efficacy against other cancers, yet the label remained un-
changed." 4 7
Once developed, physicians learn about beneficial off-label uses
of drugs and devices through medical and science journals, medical
specialty association newsletters, conferences, seminars, Internet
sources, and from their colleagues.48 Naturally, medical products
companies are another important source for this information. Physi-
cians try to keep abreast of new research findings, but they cannot
read every issue of the hundreds of medical journals published in this
country every year.4 9 Manufacturers, on the other hand, tend to have
accumulated the most information about the risks, benefits, and vari-
ous on- and off-label uses of their own products.50 Furthermore, drug
and device makers have ample ability and incentive to distribute up-
to-date information about off-label uses of their products.
As discussed below, however, many of these activities are heavily
restricted by FDA because the agency wishes to preserve its ability to
review the safety and efficacy claims that manufacturers make about
their products. Supporters of the off-label promotion ban argue further
that, in the absence of FDA oversight, manufacturers also have an
incentive to skew promotional claims in a way that is false or mislead-
ing.51 However, FDA off-label promotion policy bans all speech, not
just that which is false or misleading.
II. FDA AND THE APPROVAL PROCESS
Despite the widespread and essential use of drugs and devices for
off-label treatment, FDA and medical products industry critics insist
that curtailing manufacturer speech about off-label uses is an impor-
tant consumer protection measure. According to one of the industry's
biggest critics, U.S. Rep. Henry A. Waxman (D-Cal.), the history of
47 id
48 AM. MED. Ass'N, ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION: REPORTS OF THE COUNCIL ON SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS (1997), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/443/csaa-97.pdf.
49 See id.
5o See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1202 (2009) (noting that manufac-
turers "have superior access to information about their drugs, especially in the post-
marketing phase as new risks emerge"); Citizen Petition Regarding the Food and
Drug Administration's Policy on Promotion of Unapproved Uses of Approved Drugs
and Devices, 59 Fed. Reg. 59,820, 59,821 (Nov. 18, 1994) ("Scientific departments
within regulated companies generally maintain a large body of information on their
products.").
51 See, e.g., Public Citizen Br., supra note 10, at 8 (comparing manufactur-




U.S. medical products regulation "demonstrates beyond question that
without premarket safety and effectiveness requirements, deceptive,
unsubstantiated claims about health-related products proliferate, at a
tremendous cost in human lives." 52
The Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act of 1938 required drug manu-
facturers to submit evidence of safety, but not efficacy, for FDA's
review before placing a new drug on the market in the United States. 5 3
Prior to that time, and for the next two-and-a-half decades, manufac-
turers frequently promoted marketed drugs for various uses with little
or no scientific support for efficacy claims. 54 FDA had the authority to
police the marketplace and bring civil actions against manufacturers
that promoted drugs with false or misleading claims, but
post-marketing enforcement of deceptive claims proved difficult, time
consuming, and therefore often ineffective.55 An FDA analysis com-
pleted in 1984 concluded that there was insufficient scientific evi-
dence supporting the effectiveness for any use of nearly one-third of
the 3,443 prescription drugs on the market in 1962, when Congress
enacted new legislation enhancing FDA's regulatory authority.56
Some products on the market in 1962 were found to be not just
ineffective, but unsafe for several of the indications for which manu-
facturers actively promoted them. Few drugs are perfectly safe in the
sense that they have no negative side effects. Consequently, the "safe-
ty" of any medical product may only be evaluated with reference to
that product's efficacy-that is, whether its benefits outweigh its
risks. A drug that is highly effective at treating a life-threatening dis-
ease may be considered safe enough for use, even if it has serious
negative side effects. On the other hand, FDA and many patients may
consider that same drug to be unsafe when used to treat a minor con-
dition like muscle aches or acne, or to treat a more serious condition
with limited or no efficacy. Nevertheless, because reliable and objec-
tive evidence regarding safety and efficacy was difficult to find in the
pre-1962 era, many physicians relied heavily on promotional claims
disseminated by manufacturers.58
It was this long record of unsubstantiated and, at times, actively
deceptive safety and efficacy claims that led Congress to pass the
52 Waxman, supra note 1, at 299.
5 Id. at 300.
54 Id. at 300-04.
ss Id. at 301-03.
56 Id. at 304.
5 Id. at 304-06.
ss Id. at 306.
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Drug Act Amendments of 1962.'9 This statute required manufacturers
to produce, using "adequate and well-controlled clinical studies," evi-
dence of safety and efficacy before FDA could approve new drugs for
marketing. 60 The Medical Device Act of 1976 established a similar
FDA approval process for evaluating the safety and efficacy of Class
III, or "high risk" devices.61
In light of this history, FDA insists that barring manufacturers
from promoting off-label uses is necessary to protect public health and
safety. 62 According to the agency, its off-label promotion policy "rests
on the premise-amply supported by the legislative history of the
1962 legislation-that drug manufacturers, when left to their own
desires, frequently make untruthful claims about new uses," and it
"protects the public from promotional claims that are unsubstantiated
at best, and false at worst." 6 3 In addition, that policy provides manu-
facturers with "ample incentive to get previously unapproved uses on
label," thereby giving the agency an opportunity to review the ade-
quacy of scientific evidence supporting those uses.6 It also ensures
that physicians "receive accurate and unbiased information so that
they may make informed prescription choices." 65 Nevertheless, the
current off-label promotion restrictions curtail even accurate and un-
biased information in at least three important ways.
First, the medical community,6 6 federal courts,67 and even FDA
acknowledge that patients benefit when their physicians have access
to "objective, balanced, and accurate information on important unap-
proved uses of approved products." 68 All three agree that manufactur-
ers are often in the best position to provide that information because
they tend to have accumulated the most data about the risks, benefits,
and various on- and off-label uses of their products. 6 9 Manufacturers
5 Id. at 301-06.
6 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2006).
61 Id. §§ 360c(a)(1)(C), 360e.
62 Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion
to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, Allergan, Inc. v. United States, No. 09-1879
(D.D.C. dismissed 2010).
63 Id. at 27 (emphasis in original).
6 WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 69 (D.D.C. 1998).
65 id
6 See, e.g., HEALTH AND ETHICS POLICIES, supra note 33.
67 See, e.g., WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 69.
68 Dissemination of Information on Unapproved/New Uses for Marketed
Drugs, Biologics and Devices, 63 Fed. Reg. 64,556, 64,579 (Nov. 20, 1998).
See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1202 (2009) (noting that manufac-
turers "have superior access to information about their drugs, especially in the post-
marketing phase as new risks emerge"); Citizen Petition Regarding the Food and
Drug Administration's Policy on Promotion of Unapproved Uses of Approved Drugs
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also have the ability and incentive to communicate this information to
prescribers. 70 FDA's off-label promotion ban, however, often prevents
these most well-informed speakers from communicating, which many
physicians believe impedes their ability to learn about new uses for
drugs and devices.'
Second, even when manufacturers intend to seek FDA approval
for a new indication, it is undisputed that the agency's review
mechanism often lags behind scientific validation. 7 2 One study ex-
amining off-label drug uses that were eventually approved by FDA
concluded that these uses appeared in official treatment compendia an
73average of two and a half years before FDA approval. But even once
the necessary clinical trials are conducted and the supplemental appli-
cation is filed with FDA, manufacturers are still forbidden to promote
the off-label use. Thus, even after manufacturers take this substantial
step toward satisfying FDA's interest in reviewing the scientific evi-
dence supporting supplemental approvals for off-label uses, the policy
continues to bar truthful speech.
Third, it is not always feasible to conduct the clinical trials neces-
sary to support a supplemental application seeking approval for an
off-label use. Particularly in such situations where the off-label use
represents the medically accepted standard of care, "it may be unethi-
cal to conduct the necessary study" because doing so requires some
patients to be randomized into the control arm of the trial, in which
subjects are given a placebo or are treated with a product known or
believed to be less effective.74 Indeed, among physicians and medical
ethicists, "[t]here is general agreement that placebo or untreated con-
trols are not appropriate in trials of therapy for life-threatening condi-
and Devices, 59 Fed. Reg. 59,820, 59,823 (Nov. 18, 1994) ("Scientific departments
within regulated companies generally maintain a large body of information on their
products"); HEALTH AND ETHICS POLICIES, supra note 33.
7o See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1202; Citizen Petition Regarding the Food and
Drug Administration's Policy on Promotion of Unapproved Uses of Approved Drugs
and Devices, 59 Fed. Reg. 59,820, 59,821 (Nov. 18, 1994); HEALTH AND ETHICS
POLICIES, supra note 33.
71 See Kazman, supra note 2.
72 See Richardson v. Miller, 44 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).
n J. Howard Beales, New Uses for Old Drugs, in COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES
IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 281, 303 (Robert B. Helms ed., 1996).
74 Brief of the National Spasmodic Torticollis Association, the National
Spasmodic Dysphonia Association, Allied Educational Foundation, and Washington
Legal Foundation as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 15, Allergan, Inc. v. United States, No. 09-1879 (D.D.C. dismissed
2010) [hereinafter Patient Assn. Br.].
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tions if a treatment that prolongs or preserves life is available." 75 Con-
sequently, "many doctors understandably will not encourage their
patients to enter into a study where they might end up with a placebo
rather than standard-of-care therapy."76 Forbidding off-label promo-
tion even in cases where conducting the necessary clinical trials would
be unethical can in no reasonable way help FDA promote the supple-
mental approval process.
III. THE REGULATION OF OFF-LABEL SPEECH
The statutory provisions governing medical product advertising
are contained in two brief paragraphs within the lengthy sections of
the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act describing the misbranding of
drugs and devices. 7 7 These provisions establish that a drug shall be
considered misbranded if any advertisement does not contain the "es-
tablished" (i.e., non-proprietary) name of the product, its formula
showing all ingredients, and a "brief summary relating to side effects,
contraindications, and effectiveness as shall be required in regulations
which shall be issued by the Secretary [of Health and Human
Services] .. ... " Devices are to be considered misbranded if the ad-
vertisement does not contain the product's "established" name, a
"brief statement of the intended uses of the device and relevant warn-
ings, precautions, side effects, and contraindications," and in some
circumstances, a list of the device's components and ingredients.7 9
Neither section explicitly distinguishes between approved and
unapproved uses.
Despite the seemingly modest restrictions on drug and device ad-
vertising enumerated within the Act, "[p]romotional materials issued
by medical products companies or their agents are among the most
regulated of all forms of communication in the United States."80 To
erect such an edifice, FDA has had to piggy-back its regulations for
medical product "advertising" on its statutory authority over drug and
device "labeling," by treating advertisements and other promotional
material as part of the products' labels.
Manufacturers are prohibited from marketing drugs whose labels
"prescribe[], recommend[], or suggest[]" that they be used for an indi-
7 Richard Simon, Are Placebo-Controlled Clinical Trials Ethical or Needed
When Alternative Treatment Exists?, 133 ANN. INTERNAL MED. 474, 474 (2000).
76 Patient Assn. Br., supra note 74, at 15.
n 21 U.S.C. § 352(n), (r) (2006).
78 Id. § 352(n).
79 Id. § 352(r).
so WAYNE L. PINES, REGULATION OF PROMOTION AND DISTRIBUTION 320
(Kenneth R. Pina & Wayne L. Pines eds., 3d ed. 2008).
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cation that FDA has not approved, or whose labels contain any in-
formation that is "false or misleading in any particular."8 2 The Act
defines a product's "label" as any "written, printed, or graphic matter"
on the product itself "or any of its containers or wrappers, or [other
items] accompanying" the product.83 The Supreme Court has con-
strued the term "accompanying" to include matter that "supplements
or explains" the attached label, even if it does not physically accom-
pany the product, any time the two share a "common origin and a
common destination" as part of an "integrated" transaction.84
FDA has taken this already broad view of the term "labeling" to
re-define, by regulation, a drug's label to include any:
[b]rochures, booklets, mailing pieces, detailing pieces, file
cards, bulletins, calendars, price lists, catalogs, house organs,
letters, motion picture films, film strips, lantern slides, sound
recordings, exhibits, literature, and reprints and similar pieces
of printed, audio, or visual matter descriptive of a drug and
references published (for example, the "Physicians Desk Ref-
erence") for use by medical practitioners, pharmacists, or
nurses, containing drug information supplied by the manufac-
turer, packer, or distributor of the drug and which are disse-
minated by or on behalf of its manufacturer, packer, or
distributor ...
Under this expansive definition, a manufacturer may not promote
a drug by supplying doctors with a brochure describing scientific re-
search on off-label uses because FDA will treat the brochure as a part
of the drug's label, which in turn causes the drug to be misbranded.
Indeed, the agency has determined that nearly any kind of promotion-
al communication by a manufacturer about one of its medical products
is part of that product's label, regardless of whether the information
actually accompanies the product or is sent to the same destination as
the product as part of an integrated transaction as required by the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the statute. 86
Similarly, the Act deems a drug to be misbranded if its label does
not contain "adequate directions for use."8 FDA regulations define a
product's "intended use" to include any use "objective[ly] inten[ded
8 21 U.S.C. § 355(a), (d) (2006).
82 Id. § 352(a).
83 Id. § 321(k), (m).
8 Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 348-50 (1948).
s 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(0(2) (2011).
86 See, e.g., Hall & Sabotka, supra note 7, at 8-10.
87 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(1).
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by] the persons legally responsible" for the product's labeling.8 ' And
such intent "may be shown by the circumstances surrounding the dis-
tribution of the [product]," including information contained in "labe-
ling claims, advertising matter, or oral or written statements by such
persons or their representatives."89 Intent may also be shown any time
at which, "with the knowledge of such persons or their representa-
tives, [the product is] offered and used for a purpose for which it is
neither labeled nor advertised." 90 Thus, any communication that sug-
gests or recommends an off-label use may be viewed as evidence of
the manufacturer's "intended uses" for the product.9 1
If promotional material suggests a use for which the product's ac-
tual label-meaning information on or physically accompanying the
drug-does not include "adequate directions" for use, FDA will con-
sider such promotional material as a misbranding of the product. 92 Of
course, unapproved uses, by definition, cannot be mentioned in the
label. 9 3 Consequently, the presentation by a company scientist at a
medical seminar of data from clinical research on off-label uses can
be considered evidence of the manufacturer's intended use, causing
the product to be misbranded. So can a conversation between two
physicians about off-label uses if one of them happens to have worked
as a consultant for the manufacturer.
The federal government has aggressively prosecuted many drug
and device manufacturers for providing unapproved information about
off-label uses. From 2003 to 2007, FDA issued forty-two notices of
violation demanding that drug companies cease disseminating infor-
mation describing off-label uses. 94 And, during that period, the De-
partment of Justice settled at least eleven civil and criminal cases in-
volving off-label promotion.95 In 2009, the drug manufacturer Pfizer
pled guilty to criminal charges and paid a record $2.3 billion to settle
allegations that it promoted fourteen of its products for off-label
uses. 96 Eli Lilly was forced to pay $1.4 billion for promoting its schi-
zophrenia drug Zyprexa for off-label uses.9 7




92 21 C.F.R. § 201.100(c)(1).
9 21 U.S.C. § 355(a), (d) (2006).
94 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-835, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS:
FDA's OVERSIGHT OF THE PROMOTION OF DRUGS FOR OFF-LABEL USES 6 (2008).
9 Id.
96 Peter Benesh, Pharma Seeks Cure For Off-Label Woes, INVESTOR'S BUS.




The ban on off-label promotion applies not just to the pharma-
ceutical and medical device companies, but also to financially-
interested third parties, such as physicians who participate in clinical
trials or who are paid to promote the products on behalf of the manu-
facturer.98 For example, in January 2010, FDA sent a warning letter to
a Florida dermatologist and medical researcher for illegally mention-
ing in interviews with Elle and Allure magazines and NBC's Today
show that an anti-wrinkle drug on which she was conducting clinical
trials had shown positive results and was better than a competitor's
product.99
In the words of one observer, "the same speech, delivered to the
same audience by doctors with the same qualifications, [is] treated
differently if one of those speakers has been funded by a pharmaceuti-
cal company." 00 Ironically, FDA permits financially disinterested
physicians to promote off-label indications by "tell[ing] unsophisti-
cated patients that they should use" them, but forbids other physicians
from "mak[ing] the same suggestion to the sophisticated medical pro-
fessionals doing the prescribing."' 0' As one federal judge has rea-
soned,
the FDA does not question a physician's evaluative skills
when an article about an off-label use appears among a group
of articles in the New England Journal of Medicine, or when
one physician refers a peer physician to a published article he
recently perused, or even when a physician requests a reprint
from a manufacturer. Why the ability of a doctor to critically
98 See Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational
Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,074, 64,097 (Dec. 3, 1997).
Natasha Singer, F.D.A. Aims at Doctors' Drug Pitches, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
1, 2010, at B 1; Letter from Shefali Doshi, Regulatory Review Officer, Food and Drug






10 Jacob Rogers, Freedom of Speech and the FDA's Regulation of Off-Label
Drug Uses, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1429, 1432 (2008) (paraphrasing Ralph F. Hall &
Elizabeth S. Sobotka, Inconsistent Government Policies: Why FDA Off-Label Regula-
tion Cannot Survive First Amendment Review under Greater New Orleans, 62 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 1, 9-10 (2007)).
101 Amicus Curiae Br. of Washington Legal Foundation in Support of Appel-
lant Alfred Caronia and Reversal at 7, United States v. Caronia, No. 09-5006-CR (2d
Cir. 2010).
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evaluate scientific findings depends upon how the article got
into the physician's hands . . . is unclear to this court.10 2
Although the agency may suspect that disinterested actors are less
likely to disseminate biased, inaccurate, or misleading information,
physicians are learned intermediaries with expert training whom pa-
tients and the government trust to "make accurate, life-and-death deci-
sions based upon the scientific evidence before them."l 0 3 Surely they
can be trusted to treat information disseminated by manufacturers
with a requisite level of skepticism.
The agency's aggressive prosecution has come at a cost. A series
of national surveys has shown that a large majority of physicians-
including oncologists, cardiologists, emergency room physicians,
orthopedic surgeons, neurologists and neurosurgeons-believe FDA
has made it more difficult for them to learn about new uses for drugs
and devices, and that the agency should not restrict information about
off-label use. 10 The American Medical Association confirms that
there is an "important need for physicians to have access to accurate
and unbiased information about unlabeled uses of drugs and devic-
es."'0 s Accordingly, that organization "supports the dissemination of
independently derived scientific information about unlabeled uses by
manufacturers to physicians, if the independent information is pro-
vided in its entirety, is not edited or altered by the manufacturer, and
is clearly distinguished from manufacturer-sponsored materials." 06
A. Promotion Versus Education
By the late 1980s, many drug and device manufacturers began to
subtly promote their approved products by distributing peer-reviewed
medical journal articles and textbook reprints to physicians describing
off-label uses. Some of these firms also began to sponsor or
financially support medical symposia, continuing medical education
programs, and other scientific or medical conferences at which off-
label uses were discussed or demonstrated. 0 7 FDA recognized that
off-label prescribing was an important component of medical practice,
and that physicians and their patients benefit from having access to
truthful and non-misleading scientific information describing off-label
treatments. Nevertheless, the agency wished to prevent such activities
'02 WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 70 (D.D.C. 1998).
103 Id.
104 See Kazman, supra note 2.
105 HEALTH AND ETHICS POLICIES, supra note 33.
' Id.
107 WLFI, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 57-58.
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from being used for the purpose of promoting unapproved uses, rather
than simply sharing scientific information. FDA explained that simple
information sharing and "education" was permissible, but that "pro-
motion" of off-label uses was not. 08 Nowhere, however, had the
agency offered guidance in determining what distinguished lawful
from unlawful conduct, so any information dissemination could "con-
stitute[] improper labeling and/or promotion" when the off-label use
of a manufacturer's products was discussed.109
In 1995, the non-profit Washington Legal Foundation (WLF)
mounted a court challenge to this then-informal policy restricting off-
label promotion."o The organization argued that the restrictions on
truthful and non-misleading communication violated the First
Amendment right of physicians to receive information about off-label
uses from manufacturers. t"'
While the case was pending, FDA formalized these policies by
publishing guidance documents describing the conditions under which
manufacturers could lawfully distribute journal article and textbook
reprints to physicians"1 2 and support continuing medical education
programs 13 without running afoul of the agency's ban on off-label
promotion. In 1997, the U.S. Congress enacted the Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA), one provision of which
expressly permitted limited dissemination of medical journal articles
and textbook reprints describing unapproved uses.114
FDAMA specifically permitted drug and device manufacturers to
"disseminate to a health care practitioner, [insurance firm or related
business, or government agency] ... written information concerning
the safety, effectiveness, or benefit of a use not described in the ap-
proved labeling," if the manufacturer complied with certain condi-
tions." 5 Among these were requirements that the manufacturer first
submit an application requesting that FDA approve the use in ques-
1os See, e.g., Decision in Washington Legal Foundation v. Henney, 65 Fed.
Reg. 14,286 (Mar. 16, 2000); Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and
Educational Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,074, 64,075-77 (Dec. 3, 1997).
109 Wash. Legal Found. v. Kessler, 880 F.Supp. 26, 28 (D.D.C. 1995).
110 Id.; WLFI, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 62-65.
1 Kessler, 880 F.Supp. at 27-28.
112 Guidance to Industry on Dissemination of Reprints of Certain Published,
Original Data and Guidance for Industry Funded Dissemination of Reference Texts,
61 Fed. Reg. 52,800 (Oct.8, 1996).
"3 See Final Guidance on Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational
Activities, 62 Fed. Reg. at 64,096-99.
114 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-115, sec. 401, § 552 (1997).
"' 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa(a) (Supp. 1998).
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tionll 6 and that the disseminated material bear a "prominently dis-
played statement" disclosing that the use had not been approved by
FDA."l 7
The Act seemingly prohibited dissemination of any information
regarding off-label uses that did not comply with the regulations." 8
But, if the statutory conditions were met, FDA could not use the dis-
tribution of approved information as evidence of "labeling, adultera-
tion, or misbranding of the drug or device" or of the manufacturer's
intent that its product be prescribed for the unapproved use. "9 As dis-
cussed above, if not for this provision, the agency could use the
dissemination of such information as evidence of illegal distribution
and misbranding.
B. The Off-Label Ban Goes to Court
With a set of formal policies now in place, the WLF expanded its
challenge and alleged that FDA guidance documents and FDAMA
off-label provisions specifically, as well as the agency's underlying
policies more generally, were unconstitutional speech restrictions.
District Court Judge Royce C. Lamberth applied the four-part test for
evaluating commercial speech restrictions announced by the Supreme
Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission.120 That decision directs the court to first inquire whether
(1) a challenged rule restricts speech that is not misleading and con-
cerns a lawful activity.'21 If this threshold requirement is satisfied, the
court is then instructed to consider whether: (2) the government has
asserted a substantial interest in regulating that speech, (3) the regula-
tion directly advances that governmental interest, and (4) the restric-
tions are no more extensive than necessary to advance that interest.12 2
Upon completing his analysis, Judge Lamberth agreed that the poli-
cies violated the First Amendment.12 3
The threshold condition of the Central Hudson test was satisfied
because the activity promoted by the speech in question-the pre-
scribing by physicians of drugs or devices for off-label uses-is law-
116 Id. § 360aaa(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B).
1 Id. § 360aaa(b)(6).
"t Id § 331(z).
,9 Id. § 360aaa-6(b).
120 WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 65-74 (D.D.C. 1998).
121 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
122 id.
123 Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney (WLF Ill), 56 F.Supp.2d 81 (D.D.C. 1999);
WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 72-73.
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ful and the distribution of journal and text book reprints was not inhe-
rently misleading.124 In parts two and three, Judge Lamberth rejected
FDA's argument that it had a substantial interest in preventing manu-
facturers from distributing information on off-label uses because
doing so prevents physicians from being misled.12 5 He did, though,
acknowledge that FDA had a substantial interest in "provid[ing] an
incentive for manufacturers to go through the strict . .. preclinical and
clinical trial process to get off-label uses on-label,"1 26 and that the off-
label promotion restrictions directly advanced that interest.12 7 Howev-
er, FDA's policies failed the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test.
Under the final part of the Central Hudson test, the government
must make an effort to "reasonably fit its means to its ends sought." 28
FDA's policy "need not be the 'single best disposition, but one whose
scope is in proportion to the interest served."' 2 9 Furthermore, "if the
governmental interest could be served as well by a more limited re-
striction on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot sur-
vive." 3 0 Thus, a "commercial speech restriction will fail if it burdens
'substantially more speech than necessary."' 3 1 FDA's policy failed
First Amendment scrutiny because "there exist[ed] less-burdensome
alternatives to this restriction on commercial speech," such as requir-
ing "full, complete, and unambiguous disclosure by the manufacturer"
that FDA had not approved the promoted use. 132
Permitting the distribution of journal and textbook reprints with
such a disclaimer would, according to Judge Lamberth, adequately
promote FDA's and Congress's interests by alerting physicians that
the product had not been demonstrated to be safe and effective to
FDA's satisfaction.133 It therefore "leaves more than adequate incen-
tives" for manufacturers to seek approval for off-label indications.13 4
Most importantly, "this alternative comports with the Supreme
Court's preference for combating potentially problematic speech with
124 WLFI, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 65-68.
125 Id. at 69 ("To the extent that the FDA is endeavoring to keep information
from physicians out of concern that they will misuse the information, the regulation is
wholly and completely unsupportable.").
126 Id. at 70.
127 Id. at 72.
128 id
29 Id. (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)).
130 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
564 (1980).
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more speech." 3 5 Judge Lamberth made clear that his opinion ad-
dressed only FDA's restrictions on reprint distribution and sponsor-
ship of scientific or medical seminars, however, suggesting that some
restrictions on manufacturers' off-label speech might pass constitu-
tional muster. "Were manufacturers permitted to engage in all forms
of marketing of off-label treatments, a different result might be com-
pelled."l 3 6
The court's injunction covered not just FDAMA's off-label provi-
sions, but the guidance documents and FDA's underlying policies as
well, any time they prohibited manufacturers' dissemination of jour-
nal and textbook reprints or sponsorship of medical seminars.' 3 7 Nev-
ertheless, the D.C. Circuit vacated the injunction upon concluding that
a new argument made by FDA in light of circumstances surrounding
FDAMA's enactment rendered the constitutional question moot.138
As the D.C. Circuit's opinion explains, FDA had, at times, argued
that the Act and agency policies wholly barred off-label promotion
outside the narrow exemption provided by the FDAMA. ' At other
times, including at oral argument before the D.C. Circuit, FDA in-
sisted that its rules did not independently ban off-label promotion, but
merely established a "safe harbor" under which drug and device man-
ufacturers would be automatically deemed in compliance with the
Act. 140
Even though FDAMA appears to have expressly prohibited dis-
semination of any information regarding off-label uses that did not
comply with the regulations,141 FDA attorneys insisted that the agency
would only use violations of the off-label rules as "evidence in a mi-
sbranding or 'intended use' enforcement action . .. [but] that nothing
in either of the provisions challenged in [the WLF] case provides the
FDA with independent authority to regulate manufacturer speech." 4 2
The Washington Legal Foundation acknowledged that, in light of
FDA's new position, its constitutional claims were rendered moot,
and the D.C. Circuit remanded with instructions that the district court
lift its injunction. 143
135 id
136 id.
137 Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman (WLF If), 36 F. Supp. 2d 16, 19 (D.D.C.
1999).
138 Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F. 3d 331, 335-36 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
140 id.
141 21 U.S.C. § 331(z) (Supp. 1998).




C. The FDA Offers Guidance
The collapse of the WLF litigation left the legality of disseminat-
ing off-label use information by manufacturers about as clear as mud.
Some activity outside the FDAMA safe harbor was permissible, but
there was still no guidance to help manufacturers distinguish educa-
tional activities from promotion. Adding still further to the confusion,
the FDAMA safe harbor expired in 2006,'4 leaving no options that
were unambiguously lawful. To help clear up some of the confusion
and clarify some of the rights of drug and device firms, the agency
published a guidance document in January 2009 describing how man-
ufacturers could distribute information to physicians and other health
care professionals without running afoul of the law.14 5
Like the FDAMA safe harbor, the Good Reprint Practices for the
Distribution of Medical Journal Articles and Medical or Scientific
Reference Publications (Good Reprint Practices) guidance explains
that drug and device manufacturers are permitted to distribute peer-
reviewed journal articles and reference documents containing studies
of off-label uses as educational materials, but it carefully circum-
scribes the kinds of literature that may be distributed, to whom, and in
what form. 146 Among other things, the material distributed should be:
unabridged and neither highlighted nor summarized by the manufac-
turer; accompanied by the product's FDA-approved labeling; accom-
panied by a "comprehensive bibliography of publications discussing
adequate and well-controlled clinical studies"; disseminated with a
"representative publication, when such information exists, that reach-
es contrary or different conclusions regarding the unapproved use";
and "distributed separately from information that is promotional in
nature."l 47
Because it is a guidance and not a regulation subject to notice and
comment rulemaking, however, the document does "not establish le-
gally enforceable rights" for manufacturers, nor does it "operate to
bind the FDA." 4 8 Even if it were legally enforceable, though, the
Good Reprint Practices guidance would still only return manufactur-
ers to the position they were in under FDAMA, where the full breadth
of their rights was manifestly unclear. Distributing some types of in-
formation describing off-label uses is lawful, even in some situations
where the material does not comply with the criteria set forth in the
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guidance document. But how do manufacturers determine what is and
what is not unlawful "promotion"?
Trying to distinguish what falls into the former and what falls into
the latter category may be a fool's errand, however, since a lack of
promotion would help manufactures skirt only the "intended use"
rules. But those rules provide just one theory supporting the ban on
off-label promotion. FDA's advertising regulations explicitly define
"literature, and reprints,"149 disseminated by drug and device manu-
facturers as part of their products' labeling, which in turn means that
those items are categorically forbidden from mentioning off-label
uses. 50 Thus, there is no surefire way for a manufacturer to protect
itself from charges of product misbranding whenever off-label uses
are discussed.
IV. NEW CHALLENGES TO THE OFF-LABEL
PROMOTION BAN
Because the guidance's availability leaves considerable uncertain-
ty regarding manufacturers' ability to disseminate information about
off-label uses, and because the agency still aggressively prosecutes
violations, we have not seen the last of First Amendment challenges.
Still, despite several recent cases, FDA has so far escaped a clear rul-
ing on the constitutionality of its policies. One on-going case' 5 will
soon be taken up by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
however, and others are likely to follow. Manufacturers may well
expect one of these cases to produce a conclusive holding that at least
some off-label promotion is protected by the First Amendment.
A. Allergan, Inc. v. United States
In October 2009, drug manufacturer Allergan, Inc. filed a declara-
tory relief action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colum-
bia challenging FDA's off-label rules to be both unconstitutional and
inconsistent with the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act.152 Allergan is
the manufacturer of the drug Botox (onabotulinumtoxin A), which has
been approved by FDA for treating various muscle dysfunctions in-
volving the head, neck, and eyes, and for adult upper-limb spasticity,
149 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(1)(2) (2011) (emphasis added).
Iso 21 U.S.C. § 355(a), (d) (2006).
1' United States v. Caronia, No. 09-5006 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v.
Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 389-90 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
152 Complaint at 38-40, Allergan, Inc. v. United States, No. 09-1879 (D.D.C.
dismissed 2010) [hereinafter Allergan Complaint].
2011] 171
HEALTH AIA TRIX
as well as some of the product's more well known cosmetic uses., 53
Botox is also frequently used off-label by physicians to treat other
unapproved muscle conditions including lower-limb spasticity in ju-
veniles with cerebral palsy.15 4
Although Botox can be used safely and effectively for both its on-
label and some off-label indications, the manufacturer and FDA have
identified potentially serious risks associated with the drug when the
botulinum toxin migrates beyond the immediate injection site, possi-
bly due to overdosing.'" Consequently, in 2008 and 2009, the agency
took a series of actions intended to warn physicians about these risks.
These included a change in the product's approved labeling that
warned that these risks are "probably greatest in children treated for
spasticity,"' 56 even though the product had not been approved for such
a use.
FDA also instructed Allergan to prepare a Medication Guide for
patients and a "Dear Health Care Provider" letter informing users and
prescribers of Botox's risks.157 However, the agency explicitly re-
jected Allergan's proposal to warn physicians that, "[i]n clinical trials
for pediatric cerebral palsy, doses greater than [eight units per kilo-
gram of the patient's body weight] have not been adequately stu-
died."' 5 ' FDA suggested that, "as written, this implies that [lower
doses] have been adequately studied" and approved by the agency.159
The firm alleged, however, that this suggested dose is "comparatively
lower" than the dose recommended by some treatment guidelines pre-
pared by physician organizations and the dose actually used in many
juvenile patients.160 It was therefore necessary, according to Allergan,
to warn physicians that a common clinical practice could pose serious
risks to their pediatric patients.
Allergan proposed to go beyond the generalized warnings ap-
proved by FDA and to provide health care providers with more specif-
ic information regarding dosing, selection and number of injection
sites and injection technique, frequency of administration, patient se-
lection, etc., in an effort to provide improved guidance for physicians
who choose to use Botox.161 The circumstances seemed to fit squarely
within FDA's category of permissible "educational" speech, not off-
153 Id. at 14-15.
IS4 Id. at 15.
'5' Id. at 17-18.
116 Id at 18-20.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 18-19.
159 Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
'60 Id at 19.
161 Id at 21.
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label promotion, but the company alleged that FDA's aggressive en-
forcement of off-label promotion chilled its ability to speak because it
feared that doing so could "lead to criminal prosecution and severe
civil penalties." 62 It therefore sought a court ruling that various FDA
regulations prohibiting off-label promotion are facially unconstitu-
tional, unconstitutional as applied to Allergan's proposed speech, or
inconsistent with the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act.163
In response, FDA asked the court to dismiss the complaint for
lack of ripeness because Allergan had not yet been prevented from or
punished for speaking.16 Ironically, just a few months later, in Sep-
tember 2010, FDA and the U.S. Department of Justice negotiated a
settlement agreement in which Allergan pled guilty to criminal mi-
sbranding charges related to the firm's promotion of Botox for off-
label uses.' 6 ' As a condition of the settlement, however, Allergan was
required to withdraw its First Amendment lawsuit,' 66 leaving yet
another challenge unresolved.
B. United States v. Caronia
In 2008, Alfred Caronia, a pharmaceutical sales representative for
Orphan Medical, was convicted of conspiring to introduce a
misbranded drug into interstate commerce.' 6 7 Caronia arranged a
meeting between a Dr. Peter Gleason, a paid consultant for Orphan
Medical, and another physician who was a confidential government
informant.16 8 At that meeting, the informant engaged Dr. Gleason in a
conversation about off-label uses of the Orphan Medical drug Xyrem
(gamma-hydroxybutryate), in Caronia's presence, though neither
party alleges that Caronia participated in the discussion.16 9 Orphan
Medical and several individual employees and consultants were at the
162 Id. at 24.
163 Id. at 38-40.
'6 Def.'s Mem. of Points and Authorities in Support of Mot. to Dismiss or for
Summ. J. at 13-15, Allergan, Inc. v. United States, No. 09-1879 (D.D.C. dismissed
2010) [hereinafter FDA Br.].
16s Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Allergan Agrees to Plead Guilty and
Pay $600 Million to Resolve Allegations of Off-Label Promotion of Botox@ (Sep-
tember 1, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/September/10-civ-
988.html.
16 Press Release, Allergan Resolves United States Government Investigation
of Past Sales and Marketing Practices Relating to Certain Therapeutic Uses of Bo-
tox@ (Sept. 1, 2010), available at
http://agn.client.shareholder.com/releasedetail.cfn?ReleaselD=50397 4 .
16 Br. and App. for Def.-Appellant Alfred Caronia at 5, United States v.
Caronia, No. 09-5006 (2d Cir. 2010) [hereinafter Caronia Br.].
168 Id. at 4.
169 Id. at 4, 9.
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time already under investigation for unlawful off-label promotion. 170
And, subsequent to that meeting, Gleason and Orphan Medical each
pled guilty to counts of drug misbranding stemming from those activi-
ties. 171
Prior to trial, Caronia moved to dismiss the charges on various
grounds, including that FDA's restrictions on off-label promotion
unconstitutionally restricted his freedom of speech.172 District Judge
Eric N. Vitaliano applied the four-part Central Hudson test and con-
cluded that FDA's policy did not impermissibly restrict commercial
speech. 17 3 Distinguishing the narrower holding in Friedman, which
solely addressed the distribution of journal and textbook reprints and
the sponsorship of medical seminars, the Caronia court held that pre-
serving "some control over the off-label promotion of manufacturers
does appear essential to maintaining the integrity of the FDA's new
drug approval process." 74 Judge Vitaliano further concluded that he
was "unable to identify non-speech restrictions that would likely con-
strain in any effective way manufacturers from circumventing that
process."1 7 5 Consequently, the off-label speech restrictions were held
to be not more extensive than necessary to advance the government's
interest, and the Central Hudson test was satisfied.176
Following his trial, Caronia appealed his conviction to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, arguing among other things
that FDA's off-label promotion policies are unconstitutional. That
case is currently pending.177
C. United States v. Caputo
Caronia is not the only recent district court decision upholding
the constitutionality of FDA's off-label speech restrictions. In United
States v. Caputo,178 defendants were convicted of conspiracy, fraud,
and the introduction of an altered or misbranded medical device into
interstate commerce. Ross Caputo and other officers of the device
manufacturer AbTox, Inc., fraudulently secured FDA approval for a
small sterilization machine that the agency approved for use only on
170 See United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 388 n.1 (E.D.N.Y.
2008); Doctor Indicted for Off-Label Drug Promotion, 14 FDA ADVERTISING &
PROMOTION MANUAL NEWSL. 9 (2006).
171 United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 3 89-90 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
172 Id. at 390.
17 Id. at 399-402.
174 Id. at 401.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 401-02.
1 Caronia Br., supra note 167.
178 288 F. Supp. 2d 912 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
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certain types of surgical instruments.179 The defendants later produced
a larger, modified device without securing the appropriate FDA clear-
ance and promoted it as an all-purpose sterilizer despite the agency's
refusal to approve even the smaller device for this broader use.'so
The government filed an eighteen-count indictment, including
several counts of introducing an adulterated or misbranded device into
commerce and conspiracy to prevent FDA from ensuring that the de-
vice was accurately labeled.' 8 ' Defendants sought to dismiss the in-
dictment on various grounds, including that FDA regulations prohibit-
ing off-label promotion violated the First Amendment. Like the court
in Caronia, District Judge Ruben Castillo applied the four-part Cen-
tral Hudson test and concluded that FDA's policy did not impermissi-
bly restrict commercial speech.18 2
Judge Castillo held that, "unlike Washington Legal Foundation,
Defendants' First Amendment challenge strikes at the very heart of
FDA's ability to proscribe manufacturer promotion of off-label
uses." 83 Having agreed with the Washington Legal Foundation deci-
sion that preserving manufacturer incentives to seek FDA approval for
off-label uses is a substantial government interest, the court went on to
conclude that "permitting Defendants to engage in all forms of truth-
ful, non-misleading promotion of off-label use would severely fru-
strate the FDA's ability" to advance that interest.1 84
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the defendants' conviction,
but did so without having to reach the constitutional issues.' 85 The
court reasoned that the constitutionality of FDA's off-label promotion
policies was irrelevant because the defendants' device had not been
approved for any on-label indications.'8 6 The decision did, however,
revive the First Amendment debate by suggesting in dicta that com-
mercial speech case law-particularly several recent Supreme Court
decisions involving medical products advertising-established that
FDA's off-label speech restrictions may be "unconstitutional in at
least some applications."'
8 7
This non-binding language from the Seventh Circuit offers the
strongest defense of constitutional protections for off-label promotion
since Judge Lamberth's decisions in Washington Legal Foundation.
179 Id at 915.
180 Id
"' Id. at 916, 919.
182 Id. at 922.
1 Id.
184 id.
185 United States v. Caputo, 517 F.3d 935 (7th Cir. 2008).
186 Id. at 940 ("there were no lawful off-label uses to promote").
187 Id. at 939.
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The court suggested that, "if a given use is lawful, and thus can be
written about freely in newspapers or blogs, and discussed among
hospitals that already have purchased [the defendants' device],
doesn't it make a good deal of sense to allow speech by the device's
manufacturer, which after all will have the best information? Why
privilege speech by the uninformed?"' 88 Further, discussing a string of
Supreme Court decisions addressing commercial speech, the court
insisted that "government cannot regulate by ensuring ignorance
among consumers" 89 and "the Constitution forecloses an enforced
ignorance based on a paternalistic view that informed consumers will
make mistakes."190
V. THE SCOPE OF PERMISSIBLE OFF-LABEL SPEECH
The First Amendment does not protect false, fraudulent, or even
unintentionally misleading speech, but it does not permit government
to categorically bar truthful and non-misleading speech simply be-
cause its purpose is to promote a commercial transaction. Nor may
the government forbid truthful and non-misleading speech on the
grounds that listeners cannot be trusted to use the information res-
ponsibly upon hearing it.192 More specifically, the Supreme Court
made clear in Thompson v. Western States Medical Center that com-
munication promoting medical products, even those unapproved by
FDA, retains some constitutional protection, and any restrictions must
be analyzed under Central Hudson.'9 3 So, what restrictions on off-
label promotion could be justified under the First Amendment and the
Central Hudson test?
Although Judge Lamberth's opinion in Washington Legal Foun-
dation v. Friedman is not controlling law, the rationale he set forth is
nevertheless instructive. Judge Castillo cited the case heavily in
Caputo. And Judge Vitaliano followed the rationale very closely in
Caronia, suggesting that "Friedman is the well-spring; analysis starts
there."1 9 4 But, while Friedman revolved solely around the distribution
of journal article reprints and support for continuing medical educa-
tion programs, a more probing analysis suggests that the constitutional
188 Id.
189 Id. at 938 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc, 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976)).
'9 Id. at 938-39.
191 Va. State Bd. ofPharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761.
192 Id. at 765.
193 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002).
194 United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 399 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
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protection for off-label speech likely reaches a much broader range of
promotional activity.
Federal courts that have addressed the matter agree that FDA has
substantial interests in "[p]reserving the effectiveness and integrity of
the [Act's] new drug approval process"' 9 5 and "provid[ing] an incen-
tive for manufacturers to go through the strict FDA preclinical and
clinical trial process to get off-label uses on-label." 9 6 The agency also
has a substantial interest in policing manufacturer speech in order to
protect the public from unsafe or ineffective drugs and devices. 197
It seems apparent, however, that the federal government not only
has an interest in promoting FDA's approval process, but also in en-
suring that doctors and their patients receive truthful and non-
misleading information about all available treatment options. "The
Supreme Court has consistently held that the government has a sub-
stantial interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens," and
this interest seems no more acute than when it involves the regulation
of medical products.' 98 Although courts have recognized that the FDA
approval process for drugs and devices advances this interest, the
agency itself has acknowledged that the public benefits from the "dis-
semination of objective, balanced, and accurate information on impor-
tant unapproved uses of approved products." 99 Yet even though non-
financially motivated actors are free to communicate information
regarding off-label uses, they do not always have sufficient incentive
to do so, or to do so in the most effective way. Consequently, "off-
label marketing may enable the greatest number of potential benefi-
ciaries to receive the treatments best suited to their needs."200
Also relevant to our analysis is the fact that physicians already
commonly prescribe drugs and devices for off-label uses. The off-
label promotion ban does not prevent doctors from prescribing or pa-
tients from taking drugs for indications FDA has not approved. It
merely prevents some speakers from sharing information that could
influence those decisions. The agency insists that formal approval of
medical products and their label claims is needed to prevent manufac-
turers from disseminating false or misleading information about off-
label uses. But at least one court has rejected the argument that the
agency has a substantial interest in limiting manufacturer speech in
'9 Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 369 (2002).
196 WLFI, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 70 (D.D.C. 1998).
197 United States v. Lane Labs-USA Inc., 427 F.3d 219, 227 (3d Cir. 2005).
' WLFI, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 69.
199 Dissemination of Information on Unapproved/New Uses for Marketed
Drugs, Biologics and Devices, 63 Fed. Reg. 64,556, 64,579 (Nov. 20, 1998).
200 Salbu, supra note 32, at 194.
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order to ensure that physicians receive only FDA-approved informa-
tion.2 0 1 Furthermore, "[t]he First Amendment directs us to be especial-
ly skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for
what the government perceives to be their own good." 2 0 2 Government
should therefore balance the benefits of better information regarding
off-label use against its interest in promoting the approval process.
A. Central Hudson Part IV and the Reasonable Fit Requirement
"Under the Central Hudson test, commercial speech restrictions
must advance the government's interest in 'a direct and material
way,"' 20 3 but that alone is not sufficient. FDA's policy need not be the
"single best disposition," but the First Amendment requires that it be
"one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served," 2 04 and a
"commercial speech restriction will fail if it burdens 'substantially
more speech than necessary."'
20 5
In Western States, for example, the Supreme Court held that a sta-
tutory ban forbidding pharmacies from advertising unapproved com-
pounded drugS20 6 was unconstitutional because the restriction prohi-
bited speech more broadly than necessary to further the governmental
interest.207 Congress enacted the advertising restriction in question to
serve as a proxy for distinguishing between the small-scale com-
pounding that it wanted to permit and the large-scale manufacturing
that should remain subject to FDA's approval process.208
According to the Court, however, other, non-speech-related restric-
tions would more directly advance the government's goals.20 9
When it comes to off-label promotion, however, several courts
have suggested that some speech restrictions may indeed be necessary
to provide sufficient incentives for manufacturers to seek FDA review
of off-label claims. The district court in WLF v. Friedman held, for
example, that "one of the few mechanisms available to FDA to com-
201 WLFI, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 69.
202 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996).
203 WLF I, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 71 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
204 Id. at 73 (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)).
205 Id. (quoting U.S. v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 430 (1993)).
206 "Drug compounding is a process by which a pharmacist or doctor com-
bines, mixes, or alters ingredients," in a way not approved by the FDA, "to create a
medication tailored to the needs of an individual patient." Thompson v. W. States
Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 360-61 (2002). The Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act exempts
compounded drugs from the normal FDA approval process under certain conditions.
21 U.S.C. § 353a (2006).
207 W. States, 535 U.S. at 371-72.
20s Id at 370-71.
209 Id at 374.
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pel manufacturer behavior is to constrain their marketing options."2 10
Similarly, in Caputo, the district court held that permitting manufac-
turers "to engage in all forms of truthful, non-misleading promotion
of off-label use would severely frustrate the FDA's ability to evaluate
the effectiveness of off-label uses." 211
According to FDA, the statutory and regulatory "scheme is de-
signed to discourage manufacturers from seeking approval for one use
(perhaps a quite narrow one), then promoting the drug for other uses
for which it may be neither effective nor safe."212 The requirement
that every intended use be evaluated independently "rests on the pre-
mise-amply supported by the legislative history of the 1962 legisla-
tion-that drug manufacturers, when left to their own desires, fre-
quently make untruthful claims about new uses, and that encouraging
manufacturers to evaluate and demonstrate the safety and effective-
ness of their drugs before marketing them for new uses protects the
public from promotional claims that are unsubstantiated at best, and
false at worst." 213 In USV Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Weinberger, the
Supreme Court agreed that the pre-1962 statutory scheme that autho-
rized FDA to police the marketplace but did not require premarket
approval for new drugs or new uses, was a "slow, cumbersome me-
thod," and that it seemed "utterly unsuited to the need."214
Still, the question courts must ask is whether there are alternatives
to the total ban on off-label promotion that would also advance the
government's interests in getting off-label uses on the label and pro-
viding doctors with more accurate and complete information. If there
are, adopting one or more of these intermediate measures would pro-
vide a more proportional fit between the agency's interests and its
regulations. As Justice Powell wrote in his opinion for the Court in
Central Hudson, "if the governmental interest could be served as well
by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive
restrictions cannot survive." 2 15 Consequently, if alternative approach-
es to the regulation of off-label speech were likely to better relieve the
tension between the government's interests and the First Amend-
ment's free speech protections, and cease burdening "substantially
210 WLFI, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 72.
211 United States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912, 922 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
212 FDA Br., supra note 164, at 27.
213 id
214 412 U.S. 655, 665 (1973).




more speech than necessary," 2 16 then surely the courts would have to
find the current policies unconstitutionally over-broad.
Our challenge under Central Hudson, therefore, is to determine
whether the government could narrow the speech restrictions in a way
that permits the communication of useful information while still pro-
viding sufficient incentive for manufacturers to seek FDA approval
for off-label indications. If there are substantially less burdensome
alternatives to an outright restriction on all forms of off-label promo-
tion that could help FDA achieve its legitimate interests, the agency
would be bound by the Constitution to consider them. In our search,
we may be guided by the Supreme Court's contention that the antidote
to speech of which the government disapproves is "more speech, not
enforced silence."217
B. Less-Burdensome Alternatives
Given that non-financially interested parties may disseminate in-
formation about off-label uses at will, that physicians are permitted
and often encouraged to prescribe medical products for off-label uses,
and that physicians are a sophisticated audience with the training re-
quisite to understand FDA approval procesS218 and treat manufacturer
speech with requisite skepticism, 2 19 free speech advocates may be
tempted to argue that the government can achieve its goal by requiring
a simple disclaimer that FDA has not found the drug or device to be
safe and effective for the proffered off-label use. However, courts
have been skeptical of that view where broad-scale promotion is at
issue because simple disclaimers alone may not be sufficient to incen-
tivize manufacturers to navigate the supplemental approval process.
In WLF v. Friedman, for example, Judge Lamberth argued that a
"full, complete, and unambiguous disclosure" would be sufficient
where manufacturers intended to distribute journal and textbook re-
prints.220 But he nevertheless suggested that additional restrictions on
other off-label speech might be necessary "[w]ere manufacturers per-
mitted to engage in all forms of marketing of off-label treatments."22 1
In Caronia, Judge Vitaliano was more insistent, concluding that he
was "unable to identify non-speech restrictions that would likely con-
216 Id. (quoting United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 430 (1993)).
217 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 586 (2001) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927)).
218 United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 397 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
219 United States v. Caputo, 517 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2008).
220 WLFI, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 73 (D.D.C. 1998).
221 id.
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strain in any effective way manufacturers from circumventing [the
supplemental approval] process." 22 2
FDA and its supporters assert that a mere disclaimer would too
easily permit manufacturers to skirt the approval process and mislead
physicians and patients about the safety and efficacy of their products.
As Rep. Waxman argues, a disclaimer that FDA had not reviewed the
off-label use "would provide precisely the information known to
every physician before 1962.. .. [A]s everyone knew, the government
did not review the effectiveness of drugs" prior to that year.223 Never-
theless, that knowledge "did not in any way assist physicians in de-
termining which products would help their patients and which would
not." 224
Still, even if we stipulate that complete freedom "to engage in all
forms of truthful, non-misleading promotion of off-label use would
severely frustrate the FDA's ability to evaluate the effectiveness of
off-label uses,"225 we need not accept the theory that nothing short of
a ban on off-label promotion would adequately protect the govern-
ment's interests in incentivizing manufacturers to submit off-label
indications to FDA approval process and providing physicians and
patients with comprehensive information. More complete and robust
disclosure requirements may well be sufficient to advance those goals.
One good place to look for ideas about how to structure such a disclo-
sure requirement is FDA's own Good Reprint Practices guidance doc-
ument.226
That guidance establishes the requirements for distributing journal
and textbook reprints, the foundational requirement of which is that
the information be truthful and not misleading.227 Other provisions
require permissible materials to be distributed with: (1) the product's
FDA-approved labeling; (2) a "comprehensive bibliography of publi-
cations discussing adequate and well-controlled clinical studies"; and
(3) a "representative publication, when such information exists, that
reaches contrary or different conclusions regarding the unapproved
use." 228 Including such information helps place the veracity of claims
in the distributed reprint in the appropriate scientific context, and a
similar type of robust and comprehensive disclosure could just as easi-
ly be required for broader forms of off-label speech.
222 576 F. Supp. 2d at 401.
223 Waxman, supra note 1, at 311.
224 id
225 United States v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912, 921 (N.D. Ill. 2003).





Manufacturers could, for example, be permitted to promote their
products for off-label uses to physicians and other health care provid-
ers (as well as hospital and health facility administrators, pharmacies,
government agencies, and insurers) by disseminating pamphlets,
booklets, letters, and audio/video materials, or on websites and other
new media applications, provided they meet the complete disclosure
requirements listed above, clearly identify the use as one that has not
been approved by FDA, and include scientific information demon-
strating evidence of safety and efficacy, such as a summary of clinical
trial results or a journal or textbook reprint. In addition, when engag-
ing in off-label promotion, drug and device firms might also be
required to disclose which of the included publications, materials, or
bibliographic entries were prepared or funded by the manufacturer or
a competing firm.
While this regime would free up the range of promotional activi-
ties in which manufacturers may engage, it would nevertheless retain
substantial limitations on promotional activities, preserving a real
incentive to seek FDA approval for the off-label indications at issue.
Specifically, it is intended to require a substantive information disclo-
sure that would provide more complete, accurate, and balanced infor-
mation to health care providers, while making it impossible or imprac-
tical to engage in advertising and other promotional activities intended
to reach patients directly. Only by securing supplemental approval
would manufacturers be permitted to engage in the full range of unen-
cumbered advertising. This burdened but not banned off-label speech
would, however, provide a more reasonable and proportional fit
between the government's interests and the regulations used to ad-
vance them.
For example, this type of comprehensive disclosure would add a
non-trivial cost and labor burden to the process of off-label promo-
tion. Perhaps most importantly, the burden of providing evidence of
safety and efficacy would itself require the manufacturer or another
entity to conduct at least one controlled clinical trial similar to those
necessary to support a supplemental approval application, adding fur-
ther to the cost of off-label promotion. Particularly burdensome would
be the requirement to include a representative publication that reaches
contrary conclusions regarding the unapproved use. The combination
of all three would leave a potent incentive for manufacturers to secure
supplemental approval for the off-label uses. Advertising for fully-
approved indications need meet no such burdens, even though the
medical literature is full of studies contradicting the safety or efficacy
of many such uses.
Manufacturers could distribute these items to health care provid-
ers either in person or through the mail, but promotional activities that
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are intended or likely to target lay consumers could remain forbidden.
Similarly, sales representatives who conduct face-to-face meetings
with doctors, or physician-consultants who give presentations at
scientific conferences, could discuss off-label uses, but only within
the considerable restraints of the complete disclosure requirement.
Print materials satisfying the disclosure rule would have to be distri-
buted to every participant in a conversation about off-label uses at the
time of the conversation. And, where the required bibliography of
clinical trials is small or dominated by manufacturer-funded studies,
promotion that includes such disclosure could act as much to stigmat-
ize as to encourage the off-label uses. Of course, even with a broa-
dened scope of permitted off-label promotion, manufacturers would
still be criminally and civilly liable for misrepresenting the safety or
efficacy of their products for various off-label indications.
Importantly, the comprehensive disclosure requirement would
have the benefit of improving physician understanding regarding the
relative risks and benefits of the manufacturers' products. After all,
many physicians are already prescribing drugs and devices for off-
label uses without having such comprehensive information available.
Off-label promotion combined with more complete disclosure could
therefore be expected to improve physician knowledge and overall
public health. Thus, it would actually help to promote one of FDA's
stated goals even better than the off-label promotion ban does: ensur-
ing that physicians and their patients receive complete and unbiased
information.
Naturally, these are not the only alternatives. Scholars and at least
one drug manufacturer have also suggested other restrictions on man-
ufacturer conduct, rather than speech, which would more directly in-
centivize firms to seek supplemental approvals for off-label uses. 22 9
Some of these proffered solutions pose unique problems of their own
that may make them impractical or ineffective, but others are likely to
be useful for the government in meeting its First Amendment obliga-
tions.
For example, Ralph Hall and Elizabeth Sabotka suggest that Con-
gress could affirmatively require manufacturers to submit supplemen-
tal approval "applications for products the manufacturer knows are
being used in any significant off-label manner." 230 Drug maker Aller-
gan offered a similar proposal in its First Amendment litigation, sug-
gesting that a supplemental application could be required any time
229 See, e.g., Mem. of Law in Support of Mot. for Preliminary Inj. at 27-28,
Allergan, Inc. v. United States, No. 09-1879 (D.D.C. dismissed 2010) [hereinafter
Allergan Br.]; Hall & Sabotka, supra note 7, at 44-46.
23o Hall & Sabotka, supra note 7, at 46 (emphasis added).
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off-label use of a product passes some threshold of sales. 231' Allergan
further suggested that manufacturers could be taxed more heavily on
sales for off-label uses than for on-label ones.232 FDA noted, however,
that proposals such as these would be difficult, if not impossible, to
administer.233 Even if an appropriate threshold of use or sales could be
defined, no entity other than individual physicians and patients record
the specific use to which the products are actually put. Such informa-
tion, "at best, would have to be aggregated from countless individual
patients and/or physicians and is often unobtainable," 234 making such
proposals wholly impractical.
Alternatively, firms that do submit supplemental applications
could be afforded greater freedom to promote the indications ad-
dressed in the applications.235 But submitting an application for a sup-
plemental indication is not the same as having that use approved. If
applying for supplemental approval is the only requirement, there may
be insufficient incentive to make the application strong enough to
actually secure approval.236 Manufacturers might be tempted to sub-
mit "sham" applications with the knowledge that doing so permits
them to promote off-label uses freely. One backstop remedy for these
concerns might, however, include a ban on all off-label promotion
(even that currently permitted under the terms of the Good Reprint
Practices guidance) for indications that FDA affirmatively rejects.
That would, to some degree, discourage firms from submitting sup-
plemental applications that they suspect would not pass FDA muster.
In an extreme alternative proposal, Congress could merely forbid
doctors from using drugs and devices for off-label indications, or it
could use the power of its purse and prevent Medicare and Medicaid
from paying for off-label uses.2 37 Doing so would necessarily "inject[]
Congress and the federal government directly into the practice of
medicine," an area historically outside the reach of FDA's authori-
ty. 2 3 8 But it would nevertheless be within the generally accepted scope
of the federal government's power to regulate commerce.239 It would
also, quite unfortunately, prevent hundreds of millions of patients
from having access to important treatment options, a scenario that
even FDA's most ardent defenders are likely to oppose.
231 Allergan Br., supra note 229, at 27.
232 id.
233 FDA Br., supra note 164, at 28-29.
234 id
235 Allergan Br., supra note 229, at 27.
236 FDA Br., supra note 164, at 39-41.
237 See Hall & Sabotka, supra note 7, at 44-46.
238 Id. at 45.
239 id.
184 [Vol. 21:149
2011] OFF-LABEL DRUG & MEDICAL DEVICE PROMOTION
A more practical recommendation is for Congress to provide di-
rect economic incentives for seeking supplemental approvals, such as
tax rebates or credits to off-set the cost of preparing and submitting
applications seeking approval for off-label indications. 24 0 And Con-
gress or FDA could restructure the approval process for additional
indications in a way that makes it less costly. 24 1 For example, the
American Medical Association has proposed that Congress or FDA
"streamlin[e] as much as possible" the supplemental application
process by, among other things, "basing review decisions on already
published literature" rather than requiring entirely new clinical tri-
als.242
Although these economic measures would not selectively disad-
vantage off-label uses more than current policies do, and thereby pro-
vide incentive to seek supplemental approvals, other mechanisms
could do just that. One proposal that would directly incentivize manu-
facturers to pursue supplemental approval is for Congress to provide
extended patent protection or other market exclusivity protections for
the addition of new indications to the label.243 Congress could also
statutorily preempt product liability lawsuits based on design defect or
negligent failure to warn in cases involving on-label uses, while pre-
serving liability for uses that have not been FDA approved.244 Such a
move would not be unprecedented, as manufacturers of Class III med-
ical devices already enjoy such preemption for approved uses.245
Alternatively, Congress could limit tort awards to compensatory dam-
ages, while barring punitive damages for approved uses. With tort
liability not infrequently reaching tens or hundreds of millions of dol-
246lars per drug, one might imagine that preemption of this type would
provide a very potent incentive for seeking supplemental approvals.
Each of these options would advance the government's interests
in a manner that is less intrusive to manufacturers' constitutional
rights than FDA's current policies. And the availability of so many
240 Id. at 46.
241 id.
242 HEALTH AND ETHICS POLICIES, supra note 33.
243 id.
244 Hall & Sabotka, supra note 7, at 46.
245 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2006) (No state may establish a requirement for medical
devices "different from, or in addition to" any federal requirement that "relates to the
safety or effectiveness of the device."); see also Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S.
312, 330 (2008) (holding that § 360k preempts state liability for common law tort
claims).
246 Near the extreme upper end, for example, drug manufacturer Merck estab-
lished a $4.85 billion fund in November 2007 to settle most of the claims arising from
sales of its product Vioxx. Alex Berenson, Merck Is Said to Agree to Pay $4.85 Bil-
lion for Vioxx Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2007, at Al.
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possible alternatives demonstrates that the existing bar on truthful and
non-misleading promotion of off-label uses is more extensive than
necessary. With the few exceptions noted above, however, the gov-
ernment has not been asked by a court to explain why these proposals,
alone or in combination, would be insufficient to achieve its legiti-
mate interests. As legal challenges to the off-label promotion ban
continue, however, that day may well come soon. If and when it does,
"[i]t is well established that 'the party seeking to uphold a restriction
on commercial speech carries the burden of justifying it."' 247 Conse-
quently, FDA will not be able to meet its burden merely by claiming
that these proposals would not work. If it expects to convince a court
that these measures would leave an insufficient incentive for manufac-
turers to seek supplemental approval for off-label indications, it is the
agency's obligation to explain why.
CONCLUSION
Every day, many thousands of treatment choices are made by
physicians who must take into account individual patient characteris-
tics and preferences, drug interactions, and biological variations that
affect the safety and efficacy of therapeutic options. Within that
world, off-label prescribing is not just useful, but essential to the
proper provision of necessary medical care. Consequently, doctors
and their patients both reap tremendous benefit from the distribution
of truthful and non-misleading information about the effective off-
label uses of drugs.
FDA's ban on manufacturer promotion of off-label uses compro-
mises the ability of doctors to learn about important treatment options
that can help their patients. Although courts recognize that the gov-
ernment has an interest in protecting public health by ensuring that
safety and efficacy claims are valid, the ban on off-label promotion
silences the very speakers who have accumulated the most informa-
tion about the risks, benefits, and various on- and off-label uses of
their products, as well as those with the greatest incentive to share it.
There are many less burdensome alternatives that would promote
the government's interest in incentivizing manufacturers to seek sup-
plemental approval for off-label indications while simultaneously
providing physicians and patients with more complete information
about off-label uses. The near total ban on off-label promotion is
therefore overly-broad and far more restrictive than necessary to
achieve the government's interests. Indeed, courts may accept that the
government has an interest in preserving FDA's approval process.
247 Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993).
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But, given the recognized value of open discourse on scientific and
health matters, as well as the importance of off-label prescribing in
patient care, it is far from clear that the blanket restrictions on off-
label promotion actually advance the government's broader interest in
promoting public health.

